Abstract. Social choice theory and cooperative (coalitional) game theory have become important foundations for the design and analysis of multiagent systems. In this paper, we use cooperative game theory tools in order to explore the coalition formation process in the coalitional manipulation problem. Unlike earlier work on a cooperative-game-theoretic approach to the manipulation problem [2], we consider a model where utilities are not transferable. We investigate the issue of stability in coalitional manipulation voting games; we define two notions of the core in these domains, the α-core and the β-core. For each type of core, we investigate how hard it is to determine whether a given candidate is in the core. We prove that for both types of core, this determination is at least as hard as the coalitional manipulation problem. On the other hand, we show that for some voting rules, the α-and the β-core problems are no harder than the coalitional manipulation problem. We also show that some prominent voting rules, when applied to the truthful preferences of voters, may produce an outcome not in the core, even when the core is not empty.
Introduction
Voting constitutes a natural methodology for a group of agents to make a joint decision in spite of (possibly) conflicting preferences. Unfortunately, voting and elections are not a universal, perfect solution to preference aggregation problems. For example, the classic result of Gibbard and Satterthwaite [9, 13] says that in sufficiently general settings, any reasonable voting rule may lead to a situation where some voter(s) are better off by casting votes different from their true preferences (this is called manipulation or strategic voting). One of the most influential ideas regarding the computational study of elections, due to Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey, and Trick [4, 3] , was to study the computational complexity of computing manipulative votes. The rationale behind it was that if planning a manipulation were computationally hard, then in practice voters would not be able to vote strategically (see the surveys of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [7] and of Faliszewski and Procaccia [8] for a detailed overview of this approach and for two viewpoints regarding its applicability).
Formally, in the coalitional manipulation problem, introduced by Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang [5] , the voters are divided into two groups, the manipulators and the nonmanipulators. The votes of the nonmanipulators are assumed to be known, and the problem is to determine whether the manipulators can use their votes to achieve a given goal. The goal is either to ensure that some preferred candidate wins (the constructive variant) or to ensure that some despised candidate does not win (the destructive variant). Further, we obtain different flavors of the problem depending on whether the votes are weighted or not, which voting rule is used, etc. Some results on coalitional manipulation can be found in [17, 15, 14, 16] ; see also surveys [8, 7] .
Let us focus on unweighted constructive coalitional manipulation. If all the manipulators have identical preferences, this is exactly the problem that they want to be able to solve-they would first try to ensure their most preferred candidate's victory; then, if that were impossible, they would try the second best one, third best one, and so on, until they would either find a successful manipulation or determine that they cannot do better than electing the truthful winner.
Nonetheless, generally manipulators do not have identical preferences. In this case, the manipulators may still work together, but it is much less clear which candidate they should try to promote (even ignoring computational considerations). While they may all agree that they would prefer a different winner than the truthful one, deciding which candidate to support is a whole new game that they need to play among themselves. (To push our scenario to the limit, consider a situation where all the voters are manipulators.)
In this paper, we take the viewpoint of cooperative game theory to solve such games among the manipulators, and study computational aspects of the relevant solution concepts. As in most of the literature on voting, we assume that the agents do not have the ability to make or receive payments, so that we are in the nontransferable utility (NTU) case of cooperative game theory. (Recently, Bachrach, Elkind, and Faliszewski [2] studied a similar problem in the transferable utility setting, and obtained results linking coalitional manipulation [5] and bribery [6] problems with their cooperative gametheoretic model.) Moreover, in this setting, what one (sub)coalition of manipulators can achieve depends on the actions (votes) of the manipulators outside the coalition. We consider two different ways of addressing this-via the standard notions of the α-and the β-core [12] .
Preliminaries
Let us now define the basic notions of (computational) social choice theory and coalitional game theory, as used in this paper.
An election E is a triple (C, V, P), where C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } is the set of candidates, V = {1, . . . , n} is the set of voters, and P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) is a preference profile of voters in V . That is, each voter i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is associated with preference order P i from P. A preference order is a linear order over the candidates in C. We will sometimes write i instead of P i . We write L(C) to denote the set of all linear orders over C. Let U be some subset of V . By P U we mean (P i ) i∈U and by P −U we mean (P i ) i ∈U . Using standard notational conventions, we have P = (P U , P −U ).
A voting rule R is a function that, given election E as input, returns one of the candidates, denoted R(E), as the election's winner. (We assume ties are resolved by some simple tie-breaking rule and that the manipulators, unwilling to rely on tie-breaking, always seek unique winners; we point the reader to the work of Obraztsova, Elkind, and Hazon [11] , and Obraztsova and Elkind [10] for a detailed discussion of tie-breaking in voting manipulation.) We focus on the following (families of) voting rules:
Positional scoring rules. Let s = (s 1 , . . . , s m ) be a vector of non-negative integers, such that s 1 ≥ s 2 ≥ . . . ≥ s m . For each voter, a candidate receives s 1 points if it is ranked first by the voter, s 2 points if it is ranked second, etc. The score of a candidate is the total number of points the candidate receives. The winner is the candidate with the maximum score. The scoring rules which we will consider here are k-approval, where
, Plurality, where s = (1, 0, . . . , 0), and Borda, where s = (m − 1, m − 2, . . . , 0). Plurality with Runoff. In this rule, a first round eliminates all candidates except the two with the highest plurality scores. The second round determines the winner between these two by their pairwise election. Simplified Bucklin. A candidate c's Bucklin score is the smallest number k such that more than half of the votes rank c among the top k candidates. The winner is the candidate that has the smallest Bucklin score. 4 We use the term (coalitional) manipulation to refer to a situation where a voter (a group of voters) casts votes not according to his (their) true preferences, but rather to obtain some goal. It is one of the best-studied forms of strategic behavior in elections (see the surveys [8, 7] ). The definition below is taken from the paper of Bachrach, Elkind, and Faliszewski [2] , which itself is inspired by the definition of Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang [5] . Definition 1. For any voting rule R, an instance I = (E, S, c) of the R-COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem is given by an election E = (C, V, P), a set of manipulators S, S ∩ V = ∅, and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C. It is a "yes"-instance if there is a vector
|S| such that R(P, P S ) = c, and a "no"-instance otherwise.
Note that in the traditional definition of coalitional manipulation the manipulators, unlike honest voters, do not have preferences over the candidates; they simply want to get a particular candidate elected. Thus, this definition eliminates the problem of deciding which candidates the manipulators should support by making it external to the setting.
Manipulation Model
The goal of this paper is to study the unweighted constructive coalitional manipulation problem in the setting in which not all manipulators have identical preferences. Specifically, our focus is on the computational complexity of deciding which candidates the manipulators may support in a stable way, without breaking the coalition.
Formally, we consider the following setting. We are given an election E = (C, V, P) where some of the voters are truthful and some are willing to manipulate. We denote the set of possible manipulators by M and we will refer to them as colluders. In our model the remaining voters, those in H = V \ M , are honest voters who vote truthfully. We assume that the manipulators have a way of communicating with one another (this is a standard assumption, though typically it is not mentioned explicitly). We ask which candidate the colluders should support. Naturally, the answer to this question depends strongly on the attitudes that the colluders have towards one another, and on the way they expect one another to behave. We consider two settings, depending on how the colluders react to the breaking out of the coalition by some subset M of M : (a) the pessimistic model, where players in M want to succeed irrespective of the reaction of players in M \M , and (b) the adaptive model, where players in M can pick their votes depending on the votes of players in M \ M . Definition 2. Let R be a voting rule and let E = (C, V, P) be an election with colluder set M . Fix a candidate c ∈ C and a coalition S ⊆ M .
1. We say that c is feasible for S if there is a profile P S such that R(P S , P −S ) = c. 2. We say that c is α-feasible for a coalition S if there is a preference profile P S such that for all preference profiles P M \S it holds that R(P S , P M \S , P −M ) = c. 3. We say that c ∈ C is β-feasible for a coalition S ⊆ M if for all preference profiles P M \S there exists a preference profile P S such that R(P S ,
We denote the set of all candidates that are feasible (respectively, α-feasible, β-feasible) for S by F (S) (respectively, F α (S), F β (S)).
As a side remark, it is easy to see that F (S) is never empty as it always contains R(E); but F α (S) and F β (S) may be empty. Using our feasibility notions, we can adapt the notions of α-and β-core to our setting [12] . Definition 3. Let E = (C, V, P) be an election, M be a subset of V , R be a voting rule, and c be a candidate. We say that c belongs to the α-core (respectively, β-core) if c ∈ F (M ) and there is no candidate c ∈ C and non-empty coalition W ⊆ M such that (a) c ∈ F α (W ) (respectively, c ∈ F β (W )), and (b) each voter in W prefers c to c.
One can see that these notions are related to the notion of strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) in the game played by the colluders. Recall that an SNE is a Nash equilibrium in which no coalition, taking the actions of its complements as given, can cooperatively deviate in a way that benefits all of its members [1] . In the context of SNE, we have the following scenario: the colluders have agreed upon some voting profile. The deviating coalition can privately communicate; when a coalition coordinates a deviation, the remaining players are unaware of it, so they stick to their agreed-upon strategies. In this model, it is relatively easy for a sub-coalition to break off since the deviating colluders know in advance how the rest of the colluders will vote. On the other hand, the α-core and the β-core model an election in which it is non-trivial for a subgroup of manipulators to break off from the coalition. (Consider, e.g., an election on choosing an acceptable debt level for a country and the manipulators being MPs from the ruling party. Even if they personally disagreed with some particular proposed debt level, they would need to obtain very strong support before breaking off from the coalition.) Here, if a subcoalition breaks off then it has to be ready to face every possible reaction of the colluders they abandon.
The difference between the α-core and the β-core is that in the case of the β-core the splitting subcoalition knows that it will know the remaining colluders' votes before having to cast their own. (In the parliamentary example from the previous paragraph, this means that MPs leaving the ruling party know they will be asked about their vote on the debt issue only after the ruling party will be.)
The above intuitions are supported by the observation that, by definition, if P M is SNE then c = R(P H
It is interesting that there are prominent voting rules and preference profiles for which the non-empty α-core/β-core does not contain the truthful winner. ∈ α-core. We claim that b ∈ β-core (and hence b ∈ α-core). Indeed, b is the Condorcet winner among the colluders. Hence, if the two colluders who prefer b to some candidate x ∈ {a, c, d, e, f }, vote b e c a d f and b a e c d f , then no matter how the third colluder votes, b wins the election. Hence, no other candidate is β-feasible for the coalition that prefers him, which implies b is in the β-core.
We also have a similar example for Maximin, but we omit it due to space restrictions. 5 To study our core notions computationally, we need to define an appropriate decision problem.
Definition 5. For a voting rule R, an instance I = (E, M, c) of the R-α-CORE (respectively, R-β-Core) problem, is given by an election E = (C, V, P), a set of colluders M ⊆ V and a candidate c ∈ C. It is a "yes"-instance if c is in the α-core (respectively, β-core) of the corresponding game among the manipulators, and a "no"-instance otherwise.
In this section we present our main computational results. Namely, we provide a computational analysis of the notions of the α-and β-cores. We first provide a connection between our notions of the core and the standard problem of coalitional manipulation.
Theorem 6. Given an election E = (C, V, P), a set M ⊆ V , a voting rule R and a candidate c ∈ C, the problem of determining whether c is in the α-or β-core is at least as hard as the corresponding coalitional manipulation problem.
Proof. We show a reduction from the coalitional manipulation problem. Given a voting rule R and an instance I = (E, S, c), where E = (C, V, P), of the R-Coalitional Manipulation problem, we construct the core problem in the following way. We set E = (C, V , P ) where V = V ∪ S, P = P ∪ P S , and P S is a profile of voters in S where c is ranked first in all the ballots, and the rest of the candidates are ranked in some arbitrary order. We set M = S. There exists a manipulation by voters in S making c win in the coalitional manipulation problem if and only if c is in the core (either α or β) of the core problem (which is defined by the instance (E , M, c)), since here c is in the core if and only if c is feasible for the coalition M (as there is no non-empty coalition W where the voters in W prefer c to c).
However, could it be that the α-or the β-core problems are strictly harder than the coalitional manipulation problem? We will see that for many voting rules, the answer is "no". Due to Theorem 6, we focus on those voting rules for which the coalitional manipulation problem is polynomial-time solvable. Proof. Suppose we are given an instance I = (E, M, c) of the R-α-Core problem, where E = (C, V, P). Suppose w.l.o.g. that s m = 0. The algorithm first checks whether c ∈ F (M ) by solving the R-Coalitional Manipulation problem. Then it goes over all the other candidates. For each candidate x = c it checks what is the maximal set W xc ⊆ M of the colluders who prefer x to c. If W xc = ∅, it builds a "profile" 6 Q M \Wxc for M \ W xc s.t. the score of x is s(Q M \Wxc , x) = 0, and the score of any other candidate y = x is s(Q M \Wxc , y) = s 1 · |M \ W xc |. Finally, it solves the R-Coalitional Manipulation problem (C, V \ W xc , P H ∪ Q M \Wxc ), x, |W xc | to see whether the votes in W xc can be cast in order to make x win the election. Next we prove that we manage to make x win if and only if x is α-feasible for W xc .
Claim. Let Q Wxc be a profile. x is the winner under P H ∪ Q M \Wxc ∪ Q Wxc (where Q M \Wxc is as defined above) if and only if for any (real) profile P M \Wxc x wins under P H ∪ P M \Wxc ∪ Q Wxc .
Proof. We first prove the "only if" part. Suppose that x wins under P H ∪ Q M \Wxc ∪ Q Wxc . Let P M \Wxc be any profile. For all y, y = x, it holds that s(
7 And so, x will win under P H ∪ P M \Wxc ∪ Q Wxc . Now we prove the "if" part. Suppose that for any profile P M \Wxc , x is the winner under P H ∪ P M \Wxc ∪ Q Wxc . Let y, y = x be a candidate. By our assumption, x is the winner under P H ∪ P M \Wxc ∪ Q Wxc , where P M \Wxc is built as follows: y is ranked on top of each preference in P M \Wxc , x is ranked at the bottom of each preference in P M \Wxc , and the other candidates are ranked arbitrarily. From this construction we get:
. This is true for every y = x. Therefore, x is the winner under
If we find a candidate x = c and a non-empty coalition W xc such that x is α-feasible for W xc , then c is not in the α-core. Otherwise, c is in the α-core.
There is a polynomial-time algorithm solving the k-approval-β-Core problem.
Due to space limitations, the proof of Theorem 8 is omitted. 8 Theorem 9. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm solving the Simplified-Bucklin-α-Core problem.
Proof. Suppose we are given an instance I = (E, M, c) of the Bucklin-α-Core problem, where E = (C, V, P). The algorithm first checks whether c ∈ F (M ) by solving the Bucklin-Coalitional Manipulation problem (see [15] for the algorithm for this). It then goes over all the other candidates; for each candidate x = c it computes the maximal set W xc ⊆ M of colluders who prefer x to c. If W xc = ∅, we need to check whether x is α-feasible for W xc . We first introduce some new notation. Let B(a, k, Q) denote the number of votes in the profile Q that rank the candidate a in the k first places. Let d be the minimal integer such that B(x, d, P H ) + |W xc | > 1 2 · |V |. Let P M \Wxc be a "profile" of M \ W xc such that B(x, d, P M \Wxc ) = 0; and for all y = x, B(y, 1, P M \Wxc ) = |M \ W xc |. 9 In the following claim we prove that it is enough to check whether x can win vs. P M \Wxc to determine whether x is α-feasible for W xc . 7 We use here a strong inequality as we prove our results for the unique winner model. However, our results can be modified to work for the co-winner model as well. 8 Again, see ftp://ftp.cs.huji.ac.il/users/jeff/wine11zuckermanfull.pdf for a version of this paper containing the proof. 9 Of course, if m > 2 then P M \Wxc cannot be a real profile; rather it is just a score specification.
As before, we use the notation as if it were a real profile, for simplicity.
Claim. x is the winner under P H ∪P M \Wxc ∪P x Wxc where P M \Wxc is as defined above, and P x Wxc is some fixed (real) profile for W xc which ranks x in the first position in all the votes, if and only if for all profiles P M \Wxc x is the winner under P H ∪P M \Wxc ∪P x Wxc .
Proof. Suppose x is the winner under P H ∪ P M \Wxc ∪ P x Wxc . Let P M \Wxc be any profile. Let d be as defined above. Since for all y = x, B(y, d, For the opposite direction, suppose that for every profile P M \Wxc , x is the winner under P H ∪ P M \Wxc ∪ P 
Hence, x is the winner under P H ∪ P M \Wxc ∪ P We now resume the proof of Theorem 9. With the above claim in hand, we can compute in polynomial time whether x is α-feasible for the coalition W xc , in the following way. First compute d as the minimal integer such that B(x, d, P H ) + |W xc | > 1 2 |V |. Then define for each y = x, g y = 1 2 |V | − B(y, d, P H ) − |M \ W xc |, and k y = min{g y , |W xc |}. If y =x k y < (d − 1)|W xc |, then there does not exist a profile P Wxc making x win under P H ∪P M \Wxc ∪P Wxc (see [15] for details of the algorithm). Otherwise, we build the profile P x Wxc as follows. We first put x on top of all the preferences of P x Wxc . Then for all i = 1, . . . , m − 1 we put the candidate c i in the next k ci available places in the votes of P x Wxc , such that B(c i , d, P x Wxc ) ≤ k ci , until we fill all the critical places. By Claim 4, if we have found a manipulation, then it works for all profiles P M \Wxc , and if we have not found a manipulation, then there does not exist a manipulation that works for all the profiles P M \Wxc . That is, we have found a manipulation if and only if x ∈ F α (W xc ). If we have found some x = c such that W xc = ∅ and x ∈ F α (W xc ), then c is not in the α-core. Otherwise, c is in the α-core.
Theorem 10. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm solving the Simplified-Bucklin-β-Core problem.
The proof of Theorem 10 is omitted due to space limitations. 10 Theorem 11. Let R be the Plurality with Runoff voting rule. There exists a polynomialtime algorithm solving the R-β-Core problem.
Proof. Suppose we are given an instance I = (E, M, c) of the R-β-Core problem, where R is the Plurality with Runoff voting rule, and E = (C, V, P). The algorithm first checks whether c ∈ F (M ) by solving the R-Coalitional Manipulation problem (see [17] for the algorithm for this). Then it goes over all the other candidates. For each candidate x = c it computes the maximal set W xc ⊆ M of the colluders who prefer x to c. If W xc = ∅, we need to check whether x is β-feasible for W xc . To do so, we iterate over all candidates a = x, and for each a, we check whether W xc can make x win vs. the profile P a,x M \Wxc where everybody ranks a first, x last, and the other candidates in some arbitrary order. Then we iterate over all pairs of candidates (a, b), and for each pair (a, b) and for all i = 1, . . . , |M \ W xc | − 1, we check whether W xc can make x win vs. the profile P i,a,b,x M \Wxc where i voters in M \ W xc rank a first, the |M \ W xc | − i remaining voters rank b first, all these voters rank x last, and the other candidates are ranked in some arbitrary order. In the next claim we prove that it is enough to check these profiles to determine whether x is β-feasible for W xc .
